Presentation of the modules 
 
Compared to Juventus from Siena De Ceglie is back in the left fill-back role, Krasic replaces Giaccherini on the right wing and Del Piero takes the place of Matri. The 4-4-2 of Conte thus sees in front of Buffon, the line formed by Lichtsteiner, Barzagli, Chiellini, De Ceglie. Krasic right and Pepe left guarding the wing area, with Marchisio and Pirlo central in midfield and Del Piero and Vucinic to form the pair of attack. 
 
Bisoli deploys a 4-4-1-1, as well we will see, is transformed in the phase of non-possession in a 4-5-1. Gillet is on goal. The fullbacks are Casarini right and Morleo left; pair of central defenders Portanova / Antonsson. In the middle of the field there are Mudingayi and Perez, with Ramirez swinging between the support striker Acquafresca or to support the midfield . Completing the team with the wingers Diamanti on the right and Kone on the left.  
 
 
Tactical developments of the match 
 
After two defeats in the first two games of the season Bisoli designs his team playing a purely defensive game based on two main principles: 
 
 1) give up any aspirations of high pressure on the top players from Juventus and compact lines in their own half, leaving the offensive possibility to quick counterattacks; 
 2) mark-to-man Andrea Pirlo, excluding him from phases of building the game. 
 
Deputy to the marking of Pirlo is the alleged playmaker Gaston Ramirez that, immediately after supported the striker Acquafresca during their possession, rushes to mark the bianconero number 21. In the series of slides that follow, we see, circled in red, the fixed couple Ramirez- Pirlo which is formed when Juventus came into possession of the ball 
 
 
 The slides show how the attitude of Ramirez draws a midfield to 3 (or 5) of Bologna. That Ramirez on Pirlo is a real man marking aims to oust the Juventus midfielder from the maneuver. As we see in the next slide, even when Pirlo tries to distance himself, pulling out of the midfield and heavily moving back, Ramirez remains close to the Juventus player. 
 
 
 The tactical behavior of Ramirez is even more evident in the two slides that follow that leaves move in a central position Chiellini, but to follow Pirlo that lowers and widens. 
 
 
 The consequences of Bisoli choice to mark-to-man Pirlo are many: 
 
 1) in fact drawing a midfield that saw three men in the central area, with Mudingayi in the middle and Perez on the left half. This allows Mudingayi to act as a wall for central defenders and support them in the double play ball on the Juventus strikers; 
 
 2) with Pirlo excluded from the initial setting of the maneuver that voluntarily are left to the feet of Marchisio, or, even better (to Bologna) to Barzagli and Chiellini. 
 
 We see the two situations in detail.
 
 In the two diapostivie that follow we see how , Pirlo marked , and De Ceglie is looking for the striker Vucinic, but Mudingayi, placed in the middle of the midfield three, acts as a shield for defensive line and intercepted the passage to the Juventus striker. 
 
 
 In the following slides we see instead the work of Mudingayi to support the central defenders. Again, with Pirlo marked close, is a defender, Chiellini, trying to make the action with a vertical pass to Vucinic. The Montenegrin receives, Mudingayi is the doubling and snatches the ball from the Juventus striker. By the way, is the occasion of the first yellow to Vucinic who lost the ball, stopped with a foul Mudingayi and then be warned for this protest . 
 
 
 
The marking is subjected Pirlo finds no similarities with the other midfielder of Juventus, Claudio Marchisio, who is left relatively free to play and taken by Perez (or Mudinagayi) only when the Juventus midfielder comes into their area of competence.In the first two slides that follow we see how Barzagli finds free in the middle of the field Marchisio. In the third again Marchisio still free to receive with Perez and Mudingayi in their areas. The red circle that identifies the couple Pirlo-Ramirez is always present. 
 
 
But more often Marchisio, the burden, after the round ball between the defenders, to make the switch to initiate the offensive phase of the maneuver falls on Barzagli and Chiellini. This is also due to the fact that the two wingers, Kone and Diamanti are rather large and keeping a close line to Lichtsteiner and De Ceglie. The director of transition most used is the one from Barzagli to Vucinic with Montenegrino more mobile then Del Piero in trying to find him unmarked.Interestingly, the area chosen by the Juventus strikers to receive the ball from their central defenders, always outside of the opponent mezzala with the ball passing between the winger and the same mezzala of Bologna. The very wide position of Krasic and Pepe, who do not cut the field in without the ball when in possession of the defenders of Juventus, keeps blocked the opponent defender and free space for receiving the striker. We see two examples in the slides that follow.
 
 
 
The route that starts from Barzagli is more frequently used than that which starts from Chiellini on the right side of the attack of Juventus, the space for play is greater than that seen on the left where Pirlo moves often wide to try to get the ball . But even on the side of Chiellini the plays are the same as we see in the slide that follows and as we saw in the occasion that led to the yellow of Vucinic.
 
 
 The preferred receiver is as said Mirko Vucinic, really good at finding space and time of the movement and to control the ball even under pressure from opponents. The reception just described often triggers a series of movements that sees the winger utting inside to make room for the overlap of the full back
 
 
 
The free-kick from which came the goal of Juventus is born out of a similar tactic situation, with the pass from Barzagli to Vucinic, movements of Krasic and Lichtsteiner and with Vucinic’s ability to control the ball while under pressure from two Bologna players who commit foul on the Montenegrino. 
 
 
 
In the first half of the resulting of Bologna tactics and of Juventus counter-tactic have resulted, at least until the goal of Vucinic, a certain difficulty of Juventus to cause a danger to the Gillet goal: Mudingayi protects well the defense and the quality of Juventus ball circulation is reduced by the exclusion from maneuver of Pirlo. The number of inaccurate balls in vertical passes trigger of the real offensive maneuver and is greater than in previous games with errors especially from Marchisio and De Ceglie.These inaccuracies favor some potentially dangerous Bologna counter-attack, but, in fact, when clearly net of any wrong passage that a little balance off the team, the defense transition phase works very well and gives back control of the match to Juventus. After the goal from Vucinic the Bologna tactical attitude does not change , Ramirez continues to mark Pirlo and the team to compact in their own half but, inevitably, in attack the Bolognese risk slightly more and Juventus can find more fluidity using some of counter-attack maneuver.The watershed of the match is clearly the expulsion at half-time of Mirko Vucinic. Bologna, strong from numerical superiority and the need to break even, leave the man marking of Pirlo and steadily advancing Ramirez on the line with Acquafresca. The Bolognese then adopt a more orthodox 4-4-2. 
 
 
 
Juventus instead replaces Del Piero with Matri and sides with a 4-4-1 with only Matri as a striker. The black and white attitude does not change and defense transition continues to be oriented to the immediate recapture of the ball. An example of the unchanged attitude of Juventus can be found with occasion had by Krasic just before the goal of Portanova . Action is seen as Juve outnumbered and ahead attacks at full strength, a fact highlighted by the position Lichtsteiner, De Ceglie and Barzagli 
 
 
 
The goal of Bologna was born from a corner conceded by a wonderful parade of Buffon on occasion was born to a very serious mistake from De Ceglie. Bologna, maintains its 4-4-2 and Juventus continues unabated as if they were to play in eleven men. The only substantive difference is the number of strikers. When the in non-ball possession is obviously trying much less than in the first half the vertically play in the central area towards the striker, and opting to play on the wingers, continuously supported by full-backs. Moreover, when summoned, Matri can almost always get the ball well and put down the ball in his profit even when surrounded by opponents. We see the two slides that follow as Matri being brought under control in the midst of so many opponents to open on Pepe. 
 
 
 
 In the other example shown Matri receives from Marchisio among the defenders of Bologna, but managed to free himself and serve Pirlo arriving in support . 
 
 
 
 The defense transition has the same efficiency in ten when the team was of eleven. Juve press up and manages to retrieve the ball continuously. The two slides that follow show the line of the Juventus midfielders press high on those of Bologna. 
 
 
 
In support of the attitude of the midfielders is that of the defenders who, to support this kind of defense transition, shorten always focusing on opponents in marking the position of strikers, the ideal space cover depending on the position of the ball. The series of slides shows how Barzagli and Chiellini are always close to their men. 
 
 
 The tactical attitude in non-ball possession phase of Juventus makes the team less vulnerable with ten men than it was the pure zonal marking of Delneri who, having to always cover the space, suffered enormously the lack of a man on the field. The only real short-numbered area is located in the Matri area, potentially placed in the middle of Portanova and Antonsson.The two central defenders of Bologna do not, however, technique and personality to exploit it by patiently starting the action from the sidelines . Paradoxically, encouraging Bologna to a more proactive attitude with the surrender of the man-marking on Pirlo, the outnumbered helps Juve, as said, remains absolutely unchanged the defense transition and improves exponentially the quality of the circulation of through ball found with participation of Andrea Pirlo.That throughout the second half “PREACHES” Football at the Juventus Stadium. Conte changes Krasic with Giaccherini , with good results for the vivacity of the former Cesena on the left wing. Juventus takes possession of the match completely and creates different scoring chances. At about 20 minutes from the end, Bisoli give up and, despite the numerical superiority, seeing the difficulties in countering Juventus, turns back to the 4-5-1 which actually manages to tackle a little better the black and white football superiority.After the equalizer the Bolognese overlook to the area of Buffon only to 5 min from the end with a shot from a tight angle by Di Vaio. Vidal takes the place as left-back of De Ceglie, Juventus continues to regain the ball and bring it forward, but the effort and the new tactical approach of the Bologna make it less dangerous the Juventus maneuver. Juve still tries, unfortunately without success until the last second of play. Too bad. 
 
Comment 
 
 Individual errors condemned Juventus to a draw. Naive and very exaggerated in my opinion the expulsion of Mirko Vucinic. Serious errors of De Ceglie before and Chiellini then at the equalizer of Bologna. Before the Juventus goal the man marking on Pirlo takes a while to Juventus in terms of fluidity movement of the ball and increases the number of unforced errors during the possession.The Bologna leaves the burden of building the game to Marchisio, inaccurate in this stage of the game, and to the two central defenders. In this tactical context it Vucinic stands as a shore from which to start with the quality of offensive maneuver, by getting unmarked and getting the ball directly from the defenders. Much lower the contribution in this direction of Del Piero.The defense transition once again works well and gives the Bologna few dangerous counter, daughter of lower efficiency in the movement of the ball. Vucinic’s goal, while not changing the tactical attitude of Bologna , frees some more space in which the Juventus maneuver develops with greater ease and danger.Despite the numerical inferiority Juventus in the second half does not change tactic attitude, continues to press successfully Bologna (ball possession in the second half, outnumbered, was greater, about 62%, than the first time, which stood at 60%) and, thanks to Andrea Pirlo who, free from asphyxiating marking of Ramirez, gives at once, order, time, quality and ingenuity to maneuver, the ball possession phase becomes more dangerous.Having said that Juventus has played a great game in the second half, the revolution of Conte compared to Delneri’s attitude of the defenders (farewell to the zonal marking and instead a pure and great attention to the position of opponents) that, among other things, makes it less sensitive to the team when outnumbered situation and once again the good defense transition, Points that in my opinion has not worked well and what could eventually be a problem with this fine early-season Juventus:
 
 a) the game of De Ceglie, moreover spotted with an crass error, which cost Juve a clear scoring chance for Bologna and the corner kick from which was born Portanova’s goal, was of total modest level and stuffed with trivial errors in the phase of ball possession. Errors that break the rhythm of the movement of the ball and make it more vulnerable to the defensive transition; 
 
 b) the iron mounted marking on Pirlo made ​​it made clear that the maneuver over the last thirty feet is not as bright as has happened often to see in the teams of Antonio Conte. It ‘s always easier to coach the defensive phase than the offensive, it is also reasonable that today against a excellent defense transition and a good non-ball possession, the maneuver in the last third of the field is not yet at that level.Evidently is still need to work and I’m sure Conte will not spare energies to improve the effectiveness of the offensive quartet. Also remains an open question of the quality of interpreters with questions hanging on the inclusion in the team of Quagliarella, Elia, Krasic and Vidal. The game of Serbian was not at all bad as read in many places. He missed a couple of lunges, but has also made himself dangerous. I’m always waiting to see Vidal paired with Pirlo.The game showcased a Marchisio, in my opinion a little ‘tired and imprecise as an alternate in the role of Pirlo. The skill and tactical intelligence of Claudio make his game again positively evaluated , but the curiosity to see the quality and dynamic contribution of Vidal in the middle of the field, in 4-4-2/4-2 -4 is very strong. i don’t know the physical conditions of Quagliarella and tactical progress of Elia.It seems clear, however, that greater inclusion in rotations of these four elements, certainly with much quality, it is necessary, along with the coach’s tactical work, to give greater danger in the last 30 meters and in alleviating the tactics with exclusion by the operation of Andrea Pirlo which, especially against the “small” teams, we shall see, in my opinion, often. 
 
Beyond all that, however, a Juventus for the third consecutive time it shows a real team that knows exactly what must and want to do in the field and obviously well coached (including athletic) by Antonio Conte. 
 
by: Fabio Barcellona  
source: uccellinodidelpiero.com
adapted by: Mike Prise