This one is the first report from a Strong series of reports on FARSOPOLI, the others will follow.
Published on June 9, 2011 on MYJUVENTUS.NET


Let us win the most important match! All together! 


In this report, any statement can be verified, demonstrated, proven. Here we report ONLY the facts, sentences, laws, regulations. In a few pages we will dismantle the myth of “Juve cheat”; in a few steps you will understand what has happened and what has been done before, during and after that terrible summer of 2006. 


A family saga. “The Banks, pushed by Berlusconi’s government, were forced once again to support Lingotto’s [FIAT headquarter in Turin – ed] accounts through a particular funding transaction called “prestito convertendo” [“converted loan” – ed]; in short, such loan, once expired in the fall of 2005, would, in fact, deliver FIAT into the banks’ hands, excluding Agnelli’s family, led by John Elkann, and reducing it to minority shareholders. (…) In view of this possibility, rumors had it that the then CEO of Juventus Giraudo, following a precise Andrea Agnelli’s input, was organizing a consortium to take Juventus over by buying out the shares owned by IFIL [investment company, now EXOR, which controls FIAT, Juventus etc. – ed] with the collaboration of several important partners both sporting and financial. Under consideration there was a colossal industrial plan that probably would have made of Juventus the best team in the world for many years to come. The same scenario is extensively described by Antonio Giraudo in an illuminating interview with “La Repubblica” on April 1 2006, about a month before the outbreak of Calciopoli (1). Here is an excerpt:
“We want to create permanent resources allowing Juventus not only to internally finance itself over the years, thanks to the formidable trademark which represents, but to have a stronger and stronger world class team (…). We want to make of it the greatest club in the world, according to a specific industrial and sports model that has no equal in the football scene (…). I think that the importance of the plan and of the investments is consequent to the results one wants to obtain. We do not ask money to cover the losses or to buy some other player, but to create a formidable model that in football does not exist yet, and that would allow us to bridge the current gap between a club like ours and other major European realities. (…) It is necessary to prepare it quickly. I call it the “Ferrari’s model” since that is the example we want to follow. That is a big industry which produces profits for a sports side of absolute excellence. The same thing should happen to Juventus. It was, again, the thought of Giovanni and Umberto Agnelli. (…) At the beginning we started by working on costs and accounts, together with the sports goal. Then we have worked to consolidate the club Juventus, through operations that have brought us to be quoted on the Stock Exchange and to the ownership of the stadium as well as the implementation of a cutting-edge sports center we will soon inaugurate. The works for the jewel-stadium will begin at the end of the season. These are initiatives that will remain, able to also produce revenues other than those typical of football teams. (…) When you have solved the financial and economical problem, it is necessary gaining more political clout in the media. For Juventus, nowadays it is not so. Some of our opponents have broadcasters and media groups, and this matters a lot”.
The Elkanns, still according to what reported by the newspapers at that time, manage to neutralize the coup orchestrated by the banks through a bold financial operation, called “Equity Swap”, which effectively will allow them to maintain control over Fiat. At this point, once the hot potato relative to the “prestito convertendo” is settled, the settling of scores within the family begins, including the one about Juventus. (…) The handover had already been established within the family, but the veto imposed by Cuccia [a famous Italian banker – ed], who had never been on good terms with Umberto, forced Giovanni and Umberto to reach a compromise which provided for the latter “only” the bridge deck of IFIL, the company which is in fact the safe of the FIAT empire. In the margin of this agreement, which marked a “turning point” in the relations between the two brothers, Giovanni agreed, as a partial compensation for Umberto, for the latter to also take the reins of Juventus.
Once the two patriarchs were dead, the two factions would line up as follows: on one side the Elkann brothers, Montezemolo and the guardians Gabetti and Grande Stevens; on the other side the Umbertians headed by Allegra, Umberto’s widow, with his son Andrea Agnelli and obviously Giraudo who was one of the closest managers to Umberto. In this scenario, it will be several times reported by our sources how Montezemolo intensely dislikes Giraudo, who, despite the gruff appearance, was and still is an excellent manager, one of the best of the Agnelli’s stable(2).

Conspiracy and espionage. Giraudo and Moggi had to be eliminated from the scene, but it was necessary to find the best way: it would have been hard to justify their removal to the crowd. Therefore, an unprecedented plan was studied, exploiting the fact that in Milan and Rome there were many people who had a common interest with that of the new black-and-white course. The removal from the scene of Moggi and Giraudo was also, in fact, someone else’s goal, and not in Turin. Inter, for example: for years, based on the belief that Juventus had won with the help of the referees on the football pitch, the team from Milan instituted an out-and-out industrial espionage using family (Telecom and Pirelli), intelligence and investigation companies (in this regard, see this link: an article which summarizes the recent developments in the Telecom trial, written by Giuseppe Rombolà on 28/09/2010, www.ju29ro.com)(6).
Besides, we must not forget that the stability of the Italian football scene was intact since 1999, when the “seven sisters” (Juve, Inter, Milan, Rome, Lazio, Parma, Fiorentina) decided along with FIGC [acronym of the Italian Football Association – ed] leaders, including Franco Carraro, the appointment of two Referees’ Chiefs, while the individual negotiation of the television rights was being approved by Decree-Law; in 2006, favored by the will of several political FIGC powers, the chance of an actual turnaround came up. The scapegoats were Moggi and Giraudo.

A one-sided investigation. Parliamentary inquiries and investigations carried out by several Italian magistrates began (the fate of these activities will be later reminded…). Nowadays in Naples, a process is still going on against Moggi, Giraudo, FIGC and clubs executives, referees and referees’ chiefs, accused of conspiracy to commit sport fraud: keep in mind that everything originated from the confessions of a former Udinese manager, Dal Cin, who mentioned the existence of a ‘Roman gang’ of referees which would be close to some of the Serie A teams.
Since 2004, intense tailing and wiretapping activities began with the investigations carried out by the squad of the Carabinieri [Italian Police – ed] led by Major Attilio Auricchio, assisted by Giovanni Arcangioli (both already known for episodes of wiretap manipulation; the latter was also suspected of stealing magistrate Paolo Borsellino’s diary on the day of the Mafia attack where he was killed in Via D’Amelio, Palermo).Three informative police reports were drafted summarizing the work of the Carabinieri (called “Offside Operation”), thanks to SOME of the approximately 200,000 telephone wiretaps and to the articles of the “Gazzetta dello Sport”. You got it right. During the penal trial, around March-April 2010, Auricchio’s statements left many of us open-mouthed: neither the football matches nor the allegedly illicit episodes were carefully watched, but actually only “Gazzetta’s” score-sheets were considered…and in fact there are numerous mistakes resulting from a conduct that may easily be defined objectionable (matches with inverted scores, unexisting bookings, etc. …).
In short, the referee mistakes and the theorem of “Juve cheat” have been used to disguise the intention to strike and blow away, once and for all, one team only along with some people in particular. This is proved by the fact (but we will come back to this later) that phone calls involving other clubs were not taken into account. The other teams were not “under attention” (as stressed several times by Major Auricchio).
But the investigations were not sufficient. The evidence against the suspects was inconsistent, if not nonexistent. Newspapers and TVs, for years accustomed to hunt the “gobbo” [“gobbo”, literally meaning “hunchback”, is a nickname commonly used for Juventus supporters – ed], began to blow up the scandal (then named ‘Calciopoli’), also thanks to the first wiretaps which “inexplicably” leaked out of the investigation documents.

The sport trial and the “special” Guido Rossi. While Juventus, in May 2006, was winning the 29th league title on the pitch, the same Juve, along with Milan, Lazio and Fiorentina was being accused of setting up a criminal association to change the course of the championships (under investigation is ONLY the 2004-2005 season).
After Carraro resigned, FIGC went into receivership. A special commissioner was chosen through an unknown procedure (the act was never made public) and following an incomprehensible logic: it was Guido Rossi, a former board member of Inter and a leading figure in Telecom. Immediately he placed his trustworthy collaborators (Nicoletti, a man close to Moratti), reduced the stages of the Court in the sport trial from three to two, replaced most of the Bench putting in charge a retired judge (Ruperto), “instructed” the judges to ensure that justice was served in exemplary way.
 “(…) The process, prepared by Francesco Saverio Borrelli, a former magistrate of “Mani Pulite” [“Mani pulite”, “clean hands” in English, has been a famous judicial investigation into political corruption carried out in Italy over the 1990s – ed], will be remembered forever as a farce with no equal, thanks to its surreal and very short course in which the most basic rules to guarantee the defendants were trampled, starting with the right of defense. To speed up the farce and make it “credible” Guido Rossi sends Borrelli to Naples where, after a phone call from Nicoletti through which unlawful pressure on the Prosecutors is made, he manages to obtain the informative reports of the Carabinieri, fragments of which appear in the newspapers and media despite at this stage they should be highly confidential material. Many magistrates and judges will later state that it has been a real “juridical abortion”. The FIGC Prosecutor Palazzi, prompted by Borrelli, asks the harshest penalties for everyone and in particular for Juventus, for which they speak of relegation to third division (C1).
Zaccone, [the lawyer heading the defense team of Juventus FC – ed] during the short and farcical debate, plied by Ruperto, awkwardly says that the relegation to Serie B with penalty points would be a fair punishment, a statement which is readily put onto the record. Zaccone’s declaration, which arouses amazement and outrage among the fans, is a direct creature of the agreements between Rossi and Grande Stevens and it is pronounced just to try to keep Juve anchored to the wagon of the other accused clubs, for which relegation to Serie B with penalty was sought.
Zaccone’s soft defense is exploited by the biased newspapers which, through banner headlines, show it as an admission of guilt. The first instance sentence arrives soon reporting delirious grounds and managing to turn into overt and repeated offences (i.e. violations of the Art. 6 of the Code of Sport Justice) a sum of unsportsmanlike episodes (i.e. violations of the Art. 1), entirely inventing the crime of “illecito strutturale” [“Structured offence” – ed]. The punishment inflicted to Juventus is actually devastating: relegation to Serie B with thirty penalty points, revocation of two league titles and other sanctions.
The second instance sentence (…) overturns the first instance decision, greatly easing the punishment for AC Milan, Fiorentina and Lazio, to which the right to play in Serie A with some penalty points is given back. Incredibly, the “rossoneri” also regain the participation in the Champions League. Juventus, however, remains relegated to Serie B with 17 penalty points. Reading the delirious grounds of the decision we strangely learn that “it is conceptually acceptable the achievement of an advantage in the league table even prescinding from the alteration of a single match”.”(3)

The Scudetto of honesty. “Meanwhile, Moratti’s “honest” club, thanks to the compliance of its supporter Guido Rossi, gets assigned a title, that of 2005-2006 season; a championship which has never object of investigation and that Juventus won on the football pitch with the huge gap of 15 points.
Subsequently, Juventus decides to lodge an appeal with the TAR [Acronym for the Administrative Regional Tribunal – ed] of Lazio which, all the papers considered, defining a “legal masterpiece” is an understatement. Accurate, detailed, and especially in the figures, merciless. Everything seems to be decided: Juventus will appeal to TAR. (…) But someone in Rome began to be frightened and believe that Juventus really could go all the way. It would be an unprecedented circumstance for Italian football: if the claim is accepted, a very likely situation judging by the statements of prominent administrative lawyers, leagues should have been suspended and the trials redone.”(4)

The withdrawal of the appeal. On August 31, 2006, the appeal to the TAR is withdrawn. In Turin a summit meeting between Montezemolo, J.Elkann and Gabetti is held. The two elders persuade the family youngster to lay the weapons down. (…) Juventus, his centennial history of success and the passion of its fans are trampled on without mercy in return of the reduction of a few penalty points in Serie B (as set out in the subsequent arbitration). (…) The players themselves and the coach Deschamps are astonished by the behavior of the board that, in a council of biblical duration, sets the definitive withdrawal of the appeal.(5)

The national team and the black-and-white World Cup. Despite the Calciopoli (nicknamed Farsopoli [from the Italian word “farsa”= farce]) scandal, an unparalleled event in Italian history and not only in the football annals, despite the incident involving the player Gianluca Pessotto, despite the criticism of the media and the constant calls for Lippi’s resignation (due to Lippi’s son involvement in the GEA case) along with the proposed expulsion of Cannavaro and other Juventus players from the national team, Italy wins the World Cup in Berlin. Among the world champions 5 players are from Juventus, 3 are in the rival team (France), with 17 men altogether, including staff and players, to have worn Juventus colors.

The clearance sale of the players. Even worse, some of the most representative players of the team coached by Capello during the seasons 04/05 and 05/06 are sold (or better say sold off) by the new owners, even to direct rival teams (see Vieira and Ibrahimovic to Inter, for a ridiculous price). It must be said that those won’t be the only mistakes of the new Juventus management in the players market of the recent years; a management led by Giovanni Cobolli Gigli, with Jean-Claude Blanc as CEO and Alessio Secco (a simple assistant at the time of Moggi and Giraudo) as Sporting Director…

The damage assessment. The appeal lodged with the TAR (later incredibly withdrawn), contained the only, so far, official estimate of the damage Juventus would suffer in the event of a penalty or even relegation. Here is an excerpt: “The only non-participation in European competitions for two years results in a loss of income, and therefore a damage, which can be estimated at approximately EUR 45 million! Based on this initial assessment assumptions, it can be assumed that the overall financial damage burdening on Juventus and due to the Federal sanctions amounts to around 70 million euro (about 30 per cent of the turnover of the club) should the team be kept in Serie A, while it would increase at least up to 130 million euro (over 60 per cent of turnover) in the event that the decision of the Federal Court was fully implemented and the team was forced to play in Serie B. These are economic restrictions without precedent, to which are added sports sanctions of equally unprecedented gravity, as the loss of two titles of Champion of Italy (2004-2005 and 2005-2006 league title), an event never happened in the whole hundred-year-old history of the Italian football, in which only a single revocation of a championship title can be remembered“. It must necessarily be added the loss of many sponsors (including Tamoil), the revenue derived from the Champions League for that and the following year, the non-participation in European competitions for at least 2 seasons, the undoubted damage to the image of one of the most glorious clubs of world football. You try to estimate the possible compensation…


The Benefits. These are not, of course, the benefits for our club, but for that team that, since 2006, dominates unopposed the Italian football scene. People used to say that when the Triad [so was nicknamed the Juventus management: Moggi-Giraudo-Bettega – ed] was on, only Juve was winning. Today, is football really better? When Juventus was dominating in the years 1994-2006, AC Milan, Lazio and Roma won championships as well, and the “honest ones” [Inter – ed] frittered away, with their own hands, a championship already won during that famous May 5, 2002. Today only one team wins, there is an absolute monopolism. Not by chance Scudetto and Coppa Italia have a single sponsor: TIM [Telecom Italia Mobile, a company very close to Inter – ed]. One could easily talk of a “Corporate Cup”! 
The referee errors remain, the controversies as well. But “the evil of football was Juve.” We believe that dogma has been amply contradicted by the facts.

Hi everyone, 


We are fans, just like you, of that football team that gave us 29 League Titles won on the pitch, nine Italian Cups, 2 European Cups and an endless series of emotions, men and plays remained in the history of football. And in our minds. A team that…either you hate, or you are madly in love with: Juventus. 


With this report of a few pages, we would like to trace the origin and the implementation of a farce with no equal in the history of our Country; for years, in fact, some newspapers and TV programmes with self-styled slow-motion replays analysts and commentators have raised the masses against the football power of a team of absolute value, pillorying on the media any conduct of our managers and players and creating this way that “people’s sentiment” that has contributed more than anything else to relegate us to Serie B. We do not want to mouth rhetoric, in fact, quite the contrary. All the statements, as already said, will be briefly analyzed, leaving no space to our comments, surely “biased”. We will go straight to the truth. We will not fling any accusations; we will not name the names or report the facts if not widely documented by laws, sentences, documents, statements (and not hearsays). 


Over recent years, Juventus and its managers have often been investigated, prosecuted…but are we sure we know the events as they really happened? Have we ever been convicted? And are we sure that other clubs that declared themselves “honest” had not committed out-and-out criminal offences over unsuspected years? We believe that only few of you are aware of how things are and only a careful analysis of all the news circulating on internet has led us to uncover the harsh reality. 


Our aim is to spread as much as possible the truth, too often hushed up by the media: the only act of presumption we could be accused of is the willingness to make EVERYONE understand, both Juventus brothers and others, that what was committed in 2006 and all that preceded and followed, is a scandal that should not only concern 2-3000 frantic fans, but an entire people. A Country that declares itself civil, like ours, cannot have concealed a mess so obvious and that includes a series of unheard-of outrages… 


We are confident that soon even those who are in the dark will understand. 


We conclude by thanking the editorial staff of the website ju29ro.com (read “juventinovero”), online magazine, our precious and irreplaceable source of information and articles, and all “friends” websites we have drawn from to write these few pages, concise to the bone by necessity, but full of news, perhaps unknown to many of you (repeat: NEWS, OBJECTIVE FACTS, not “rumors”). Any link to the original article may be consulted free of charge on the web. Many websites that carry out our own same battles will be mentioned in the links and bibliography section. 
We do not certainly do it for money, we do not want to pass for a pain in the neck, and we have no copyright. We are doctors, nurses, surveyors, engineers, workers, housewives, clerks, lawyers, students, Juventus small shareholders, journalists…who do not act for profit: print and share as many copies as you can! 
Maybe we have a last wish: we would like that all the Juventus people could finally be close-knit. At stake there is the restitution of the league titles deservedly won on the pitch and, above all, the return of the dignity as well as the rehabilitation before the nation and the world. We would be pleased that, in the event of a favorable outcome, we could all come together to celebrate; and that, if necessary, we would be ready to give full support to the club management, in every possible, available, civil and lawful way. 


Only and forever “Forza Juve”.


AUTHORITATIVE OPINIONS 
Corrado de Biase: (Head of Investigations Office in 1980): “The trial held this summer has given birth to a “juridical abortion”” 
Francesco Cossiga: “I feel ashamed for that travesty of justice which is the Commission of Federal Appeal: I was very surprised that a serious jurist stooped so low as to go to chair it… ” 
Enzo Biagi: “An insane ruling because it was built on nothing, on wiretaps difficult to interpret and unserviceable in a trial worthy of the name (…). It might be that to cover a giant-sized scandal (Laziogate, Telecom, ed) they have identified Moggi as the villain to feed the populace?” 
Piero Ostellino (journalist, formerly director of “Corriere della Sera”): “All of them agreed to a moralistic formula, for a visceral hatred against Juve or just stupidity (…) because the Italian press too often (not just in this respect) is simply obscene.” 


GOALS 
For the dignity, for the history of Juventus, but also for the future of the team and the club For Italy: for the cancellation of an unprecedented farce, which hit the 4th industry in the country (football) 1) Revocation of the of the “cardboard” 2005/2006 Scudetto, awarded to Inter in 2006; 2) Complete revision of the sports sentences; 3) Return of the titles for lack of crimes (along with any penalties for other clubs found guilty); 4) Compensation under the civil law; 


DUTIES OF THE FANS 
– UNDERSTANDING AND SPREAD THE TRUTH 
– SEEK JUSTICE THROUGH CIVIL AND ALLOWED METHODS 
– URGE THE OWNERS, WITH THE AVAILABLE MEANS (letters, e-mail, banners, …) SHOULD THEY NOT COMPLITELY COMMIT IN THE DISPUTE (but finally, after four years of devastating management, with the arrival of Andrea Agnelli, signs of a strong and determined club presence can be seen).