This one is the fourth report from a Strong series of reports on FARSOPOLI, the others will follow.

Published on August 11, 2011 on MYJUVENTUS.NET
While Juventus had to undergo several processes, which have always ended with the acquittal or dismissal of the cases, there are much more serious crimes (and not simple offences) committed over the past years by our rivals, only that they did not receive the same treatment and, above all, the same punishment. We will only take a few teams (Inter, Milan, Roma) which, for historical reasons, we care more about even if,
for reasons of space, we are forced to neglect some episodes that concern either them (1910, 1929, championships etc. ..) or other clubs (Lazio, Fiorentina, Parma, …).
The content and structure of the following paragraph is based on Dr.Zoidberg’s article “Find the differences/1”, 4 of July 2007, published on with some important additions and news.
Balance sheets – Milan. 190 billion lire [old Italian Lira, nowadays around 95 million Euro but without considering inflation and real currency value – ed] of slush funds destined to the players (1992-97): everything goes unpunished due to the expiration of the statutory terms thanks to the new law on accounting fraud enacted by Berlusconi (August 3, 2001).
Lentini’s case (1992). 10 billion lire [around 5 million Euro – ed] under the table. For half of the 1991/92 season Berlusconi is the owner of two teams (AC Milan and Torino): the statutory terms expire.
2002/03. AC Milan is granted to close the devastated budget on December 31 instead of the standard date, June 30.
Balance sheets – Inter. Late honored surety (2002). The FIGC allows Inter to “close” it on March 31, rather than December 31. In practice, while other teams bring the credentials to enroll in the following year championship, Inter closes the registration procedure for the year before.
Balance sheets – Roma. False surety (2003). Among other things, it was submitted beyond time limits. Cosenza club, for the same reason, had to go bankrupt. We will avoid talking about the recent bankruptcy of Roma, whose management has been now entrusted to Unicredit, to which Sensi’s Italpetroli owed 325 mln euro [Sensi family owns the Italian holding Italpetroli through which they control and own the football club Roma – ed].
Inflated capital gains – AC Milan and Inter. (1999-2005) How to fix the balance sheets and be in compliance with the parameters required to take part in the league? By adopting the system of fictitious capital gains, as simple as that. A gain is obtained by trading a player for a value greater than the price he was paid for. This is fictitious because if I sell for 20 million a player whose real value is, for example, 1m euro, I fix the budget. But the other team does not want certainly to do some charity: so they trade another player of little value for the same amount (fictitious crossed capital gain). Why? That’s simple! Unlike earnings, costs do not directly affect the current fiscal year, but they are amortized, or spread, over several years. The cost of the players, in particular, is amortized over a period equal to the duration of the stipulated contract. So, if by trading a player of mine I make 20, buying a new one I only lose 4, at least in relation to the current season. The method of the “cross fictitious” capital gains is, however, a double-edged sword. If it is used only once, it does not hurt, but if becomes a habit, the risks are many. Many Serie A clubs (with the exception of Juventus and a few others), in order to compensate for the operating loss, have not taken up a plan to reduce the costs but have used the system of capital gains, burdened each year with additional depreciation expenses. To cite a specific case, in 2002 Inter have made 102 million gains but has reported on the balance sheet depreciation for 108 million. And this against an operating income of 125 millions! Thus, revenues of 125 million were used to cover just the disproportionate depreciation expenses generated over those few years, when they resorted to the system just analyzed. Just like Inter, many other Italian clubs have found themselves with huge debts due to reckless use of this mechanism. Suffice it to say that in 1998, capital gains on player sales accounted for 31% of total revenues, rising to 71% only a year later. A situation that would have led to a complete collapse of the Italian football system if it was not occurred, in 2003, the infamous “Decreto Salva-Calcio” [another name of the “Spalmadebiti” – ed].
Major protagonists in the “system” have been Inter and AC Milan. In July 2002 the full-back Francesco Coco, sold to Inter for 29 million euro, has provided the “rossoneri” a gain of 28.8m. Reverse path for midfielder Clarence Seedorf who left Inter for the same amount. Many other players have changed team, raising suspicions: Ginestra, Bogani, Cordone, Bonura, Polizzano, Di Sauro. Each trade has yielded gains between 3.5 and 5.5 million euro. Inter, which between 1997/98 and 2004/05 obtained 400 million euro in capital gains, was able to sell in 2001 Macellari to Bologna for 12 million euro!(21). 
Brunelli’s case (2006). Wild capital gain for an unknown kid. False signature to sign the contract right on time to close the fiscal year (the player was in Sardinia).
Inflated capital gains – Roma. (2000-2004). At the end of the fiscal year June 30, 2002, 95.3 million capital gains are recorded in the balance sheet, derived from the sale of the following top-class players: Marco Amelia, Cesare Bovo, Franco Brienza (at that time unknown), Simone Casavola, Daniele Cennicola,
Daniele De Vezze, Giuseppe Di Masi, Simone Farina, Alberto Fontana, Gianmarco Frezza, Armando Guastella, Daniele Martinetti, Giordano Meloni, Matteo Napoli, Simone Paoletti, Manuel Parla, Marco Quadrini, Cristian Ranalli, Fabio Tinazzi, Alfredo Vitolo.
“Spalmadebiti” Law (2003): In the fall of 2002, Italian football is on the brink of precipice. Only Juventus, Bologna and some lower level club can be declared “healthy”, while all the others are in a pre-bankruptcy situation. The presidents, scared, address the Parliament. On February 27, 2003 the infamous law, called “spalmadebiti” or better, “Salva-Calcio” [“football-saving” – ed], is issued and allows recalculating the value of player assets, i.e. allows “devaluing” them. The only way to amortize the costs of players’ registration and contracts (costs that are additional to other management needs) is by reducing the player assets, in order to pay annually lower depreciation expenses. A permitted operation, indeed required, but that no one has ever performed. However, if one operate a correct devaluation, losses are generated: thanks to the “Salva-Calcio” Law, clubs devalue their assets and the consequent loss is “smeared” over ten years, instead of burdening all and only once on a single financial statement (as indicated by the Civil Code).
So those who operated craftily with the capital gains got away with a slap on the wrist. Those who behaved properly are instead left with absolutely nothing: just think of the four teams in Rome and Milan which have total write-downs for 900 million euro that, if reported in a single statement, would have caused their bankruptcy.
The figures are staggering: Inter, that before the entry into force of Salva-Calcio claimed to have player assets worth 357 million euro, was left with assets for only 38 million. Magic. A record difference of 319.39 million. Second place for AC Milan, which brought down the assets to 242 million, followed by Lazio with 212.91, and finally Roma with 133.6. There are also many other smaller clubs but they do not reach such stratospheric amounts. As it is well known, Juventus did NOT make use of the Law.
However, such Law violates the Italian Civil Code and the Fourth EEC Directive. On 14 March 2005, the European Commissioner on Competition, Mario Monti, rejects irrevocably the Law, referring Italy for infringement: the “spalmadebiti” decree, a brainwave of Italian politics to save fourteen clubs in Serie A and B from bankruptcy during the 2003 season, violates the EU Directive on financial statement and consolidated financial statement, general accounting rules.
It should be noted once again that the Salva-Calcio has been passed by the Berlusconi government (incidentally the owner of AC Milan, three TV stations that broadcast football, the advertising agency that takes care of the Italian National team and also Adriano Galliani’s boss, who still incidentally is president of the League) and strongly supported by his friend Franco Carraro, president of FIGC and of Mcc, merchant bank of the Capitalia group, which has loaned a lot of money to some Serie A teams.(22)
Sale of the brand: once the effects of the “spalmadebiti” Law were cancelled, a new accounting artifice was created: the sale of the brand to oneself, which allowed AC Milan to save 181.3 million euro, Inter 159 and Lazio 95.36. The same procedure was also followed by Roma, Sampdoria and other smaller teams. In the world of football, companies that buy the brand are legal entities specially created and owned by the selling football clubs. The money that the subsidiary company pays to the one selling the brand comes, as a matter of fact, from a bank loan. This way, the assignee (the selling club) pays every year the capital quota of the loan, plus the resulting interests. This entire money circle is nothing more than a bank loan in disguise, which allows financially troubled clubs to spread the debt for the umpteenth time over several years. Here are (taken from the financial newspaper “Il Sole 24 Ore”, 4/11/2006) the values of the sales, the name of the subsidiary and the date of the sale: Milan: 183.7 – Milan Entertainment srl (30Sept05); Inter: 158 – Inter Brand Srl (29Dec05); Roma: 125 – Soccer sas (21Nov06); Lazio: 95.4 – Lazio Spa Marketing & Communication (29Sept06).
Once again, as for the “spalmadebiti”, Juventus does not appear, having the management acted to get the accounts square. But what gives more to think, is the “complete neglect shown by the sports newspapers, too much concentrated on ditching Juventus. Dates back to the same month the news according to which the “Guardia di Finanza” [Italian finance police – ed] has ordered an inspection on the safe-deposit boxes of Juventus players (and indeed even of their wives) to find any possible illegal payments. They did not find anything”. “Interesting” is the case of Inter which managed to sell the brand to itself and at the same time
offer it as a pledge to the bank, filtering everything through a holding company to this purpose established. In addition Inter, thanks to Guido Rossi’s dexterous work, mocked the severity of the Covisoc, enrolling without problems in the 2006/07 season, the one following the judgments of Calciopoli…Did you know that Inter and AC Milan enrollments in that Championship were initially rejected?(23)
Even the Sports Justice intervened and closed the sporting trial with financial sanctions for the alleged accounting fraud of Milan, Inter and other teams. These clubs made use of Article 23 of the Code of Sports Justice under which parties may reach an agreement with the Federal Prosecutor’s Office before the end of the first instance trial, asking the Judges to apply a reduced penalty. In practice, admission with plea-bargain. (24)
False passports – Milan. Dida’s case. 1 billion lire [around 500000 € – ed] fine, 4 months suspension for the player who is loaned out.
False passports – Inter. Recoba’s case (1999). “Summer 1997: for 7 billion lire [around 3.5 million €] Inter purchases from Nacional Montevideo the Uruguayan footballer Alvaro Recoba (…) but there is a problem: Recoba is non-EU citizen and Inter roster already has five non-EU, as many as allowed by the rules: Simic, Jugovic, Ronaldo, Mutu and Cordoba. The solution comes September 12, 1999; just over two months since his return to Milano (from Venice, ed), Recoba gets the craved EU passport. (…) At the end of the 99/00 season, Recoba gets from Moratti a magnificent contract renewal, well over the one billion and two hundred million lire [around 600000 € – ed] until then received. A contract, to be honest, never seen before: 15 billion lire a year [around 7.5 million € – ed]”.
In 2000, several Serie A players are found to be in possess of fake documents and the phenomenon seems to be widespread. “This is the scandal called “Passaportopoli” which involves seven clubs (Inter, Lazio, Roma, Milan, Udinese, Vicenza, Sampdoria), 14 players (including Recoba, Veron, Fabio Junior, Bartelt, Dida) and 15 managers (Oriali, Ghelfi, Baldini, Cragnotti, Governato, Pulici, Pozzo, Marcatti, Marino, etc.). Inter is officially involved on January 30, 2001, when the prosecutor of Udine, Paolo Alessio Vernì, orders an inspection into Inter headquarter and Recoba’s private home in Milan: even his passport is forged. (…) The prosecutor of Rome, Silverio Piro, who heads the investigation, (…) states that Inter manager Oriali, suggested by Roma consultant Franco Baldini, has been in contact with a mysterious recruiter who helped him obtain the document. (…) There is only a possibility: the passport is false. Not only that, Inter management was fully aware of the fraudulent way they were going to take up, since it was never submitted to the Italian authorities any request for a passport release. (…) According to the regulations, every match where Recoba has played as EU citizen should cost Inter a defeat by forfeit and a penalty point. The penalization points in total would then amount to the enormous figure of 56 points, leading to the relegation of the “nerazzurri”, should such measure be applied in the previous season (1999/2000, where they reached 58 points) or in the ongoing season (2000/2001, later that year they will reach 51 points). But there is a loophole, on which Milan CEO Galliani is working more than everyone: a reform of the article of the FIGC regulations limiting the use of non-EU players. A modification of the rule would lead to a very substantial attenuation of the punishment. (…) Moratti sides with Galliani (olden times…) and makes a statement that, with hindsight, proves to be incredibly funny: “If Recoba is suspended and then the ordinary court acquits him, who is going to give us back suspensions and penalties?”At the outbreak of Calciopoli, on the contrary, no one expected the end of the judicial procedure: the sentences were handed down in two weeks. And if the ordinary justice acquits Moggi and Giraudo, who will give Juventus back the Serie A and the Scudetti?. (…) Six days before the end of the season and despite the strong opposition of the Players Association headed by Campana, arrives the modification of the rule on the enrolment and use of non-EU players. And never mind if the rules are changed when the season is ongoing, with Roma and Juventus contending for the championship point by point. It is now clear that everything is going to be forgotten: (…) June 27 arrive the sentences confirming the expectations. Suspensions only for the players, a pat on the cheek for the clubs (i.e.fines). Inter gets away with a fine of two billion lire [around 1million € – ed], Recoba and Oriali are suspended for one year, Franco Baldini for nine months. Inter CEO Rinaldo Ghelfi is obviously acquitted, he was charged with direct liability. This way the much dreaded penalty affecting the league rankings is avoided. (…) Inter complaints work and, in October, the Chamber of Conciliation of CONI completes the picture, reducing Recoba’s suspension to 4 months (and he serves half of it during the summer), Oriali’s to 6 months and reducing the
fine for the club to a billion four hundred million lire [around 700000 € – ed]. Anyway the response of the ordinary justice to put an end to the story is still missing. On May 25, 2006, seven years after the facts in dispute, the Court of Udine sentences Oriali and Recoba, who admit the forgery of the documents (also a fake driving license pops out for Recoba) and negotiate the punishment: ANSA: – The magistrate of the Court of Udine, Giuseppe Lombardi, accepted the request for settlement of the Uruguayan Inter striker Alvaro Recoba and Inter manager Gabriele Oriali, inflicting the penalty of six months imprisonment each (replaced by a fine of 21,420 euro) for the crimes of falsification and receiving within the investigation on the procedures carried out to make EU citizens a few players without European ancestors. (…)
After the conviction of the Court of Udine, some Juventus fans noticed a detail of the story which was shamefully neglected. This would be a new piece of investigation that can lead to the reopening of disciplinary proceedings, in accordance with Article 18 paragraph 3 of the Code of Sports Justice. But no one wants to get their hands dirty and go against the new masters of Italian football after the farce of Calciopoli: Massimo Moratti and Marco Tronchetti Provera.
On July 26, during the news broadcasted on Rai, it is announced that, following the judgments of Calciopoli, the 2005/06 Scudetto is awarded to Inter. To collect the reactions of the “nerazzurri”, a live special is broadcasted from Brunico, where the team is going to play a friendly match. To answer the correspondents’ questions there is Gabriele Oriali, who talks of “Scudetto of honesty.” Just the same Oriali that two months earlier bargained the punishment for fraud and receiving…shameless ….”(25).
Irregular championships – Inter. Case Genoa-Inter 2-3 (1983). Fixed match ruined by an unexpected Bagni’s goal 3 minutes before the end; teammates and opponents are left perplexed and speechless. Milito-Motta case (2010). On May 21, 2009, Inter and Genoa found the agreement for the trade of Thiago Motta and Milito from Genoa to Inter. The point is that Preziosi, at the time of negotiation, was suspended. In fact, the accusation the two presidents are charged with is a meeting, immediately flaunted by both (only later clumsily withdrawn by Moratti who became, as a result of this, guilty of “unreliable testimony” in front of the Federal Prosecutor Palazzi), where the agreement between the parties was actually reached. More than a year later, “the Disciplinary Committee debated the referral of Preziosi and Moratti who, according to the indictment of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, violated the Article 10 of the Code of Sports Justice which prohibits one from dealing with suspended members, otherwise the documents will not be valid. (…) The article 10 leaves no doubt about it, those transfers must be revoked; in case of contact with suspended managers, article 10 reads, “the acts, even if concluded, shall be null and void.” (…) Not only transfers are to be invalidated, there is also a rule of the Code of Sports Justice (reported on the Article 17.8) which punishes with penalty points irregularities such as those ascertained against Moratti’s Inter: for this reason, according to regulations, last season Ranieri’s and Sensi’s AS Roma scored more points than Moratti’s and Mourinho’s Inter.”(26)
Here’s how it ended: 3 months of suspension for Massimo Moratti, 6 for Enrico Preziosi, € 45,000 fines to Inter…no other penalties.
Dubious matches – Roma. Referee Vautrot’s attempted corruption before Rome-Dundee, European Cup (1984). One year disqualification from the cups converted to a fine of 168 million lire [around 85000€ – ed]. Rules changed on the run (2001). 3 days before the decisive match for the title, the rules on the use of non-EU players are changed. Juve of the “powerful” Moggi and Giraudo tries to oppose, but gets nothing. Therefore Roma can line up the non-EU player Nakata who is decisive scoring the equalizer (2-2).
Doping – Inter. Kallon tested positive for Nandrolone (2003). All the other cases were occurred in 2001, arousing suspicions on “faulty” supplements. Kallon’s case is isolated (two years later), those supplements were no longer commercially available. Georgatos reveals to have witnessed strange drug practices inside the Inter dressing room (2006). No investigations.
Doping – Milan. Gattuso, Seedorf and 3 other Milan players (5 out of 15 denials overall….) refuse to undergo the cross-tests (5 and 20 March 2005) requested by, among others, Galliani himself and introduced a year before. Their justifications (lack of proper hygienic conditions) are completely disavowed by the managers of the anti-doping labs: in an official statement the President of the sporting Federmedici, Maurizio Casasco, rejects the justifications adduced by the “rossoneri”: Gattuso has never entered the room for blood collection but only the room prepared for the collection of urine samples. (…) The sports doctors
do not treat athletes like “animals”, but they exercise their role with sensitivity and professionalism. It is therefore not justifiable that to justify a decision, however legitimate, they make untrue claims and ascribe the blame to the behavior of the doctors.
Despite Galliani’s proclamations and Carraro’s promises, Gattuso and Pancaro are not excluded from being capped for the national team. In addition, the Milan midfielder, who is in the board of AIC (Italian Footballer Association), seems to have forgotten that he fought for the introduction of the new method of control, as confirmed by the commitment made in front of Campana.(27) No one investigates on the matter. Borriello tested positive to anti-doping for two corticosteroids (2006). The justification about the vaginal cream of his girlfriend does not hold (such a small amount cannot result positive in the tests).Where did the footballer take those substances? For him three months of suspension.
Espionage – Inter. De Santis, Vieri, Jugovic were tailed. Juventus phones were bugged. “In May, 2006 the newspaper “Il Giornale” published an article by Gian Marco Chiocci entitled “Referee De Santis spied: dossier on his private life”, which reads: “It’s called “Operazione Ladroni” [Operation Thieves – ed] the confidential massive report on the referee Massimo De Santis…”, “…they suspect that to demand investigations onto the connections between Moggi, De Santis and Fabiani had been Inter”(…). On June 22, 2006, the lieutenant of police Piero Vincenti questions Caterina Plateo, Telecom employee and A.Bove’s secretary (Bove was a member of the TIM –Telecom Italia Mobile- security team, who committed suicide under mysterious circumstances in July 21, 2006). She says: “The documentation that you show me concerns the progress of inbound and outbound traffic on telephone numbers registered to FIGC, Ceniccola, Football Management, Juventus F.C., Gea World. They have been requested to me as usual by Adamo Bove on 02/11/2003 and, after I processed them, they were delivered to him. I do not know what use he has made of them and the words “Pratica Como” [Como practice – ed] was a reminder known only to him.”
On 31 August 2006, Inter owner Massimo Moratti, in an interview with Claudio Sabelli Fioretti, admits to have commissioned an investigation on De Santis. Still Moratti, in an interview with Beccantini of “La Stampa” (September 2006), repeats: “I reply to you as I replied to Claudio Sabelli Fioretti: a guy came forward to do it. He was in contact with people at the Ministry where De Santis had worked. They could give us some information. Result: zero all along. “(…) “La Gazzetta dello Sport” writes that on 19 March 2007 Milan Prosecutor’s Office sent to the FIGC the documentation concerning the Tavaroli-Inter-Telecom affair. On 22 June 2007, the FIGC issued a press release announcing that the federal prosecutor (Palazzi), after numerous press articles reporting on the behavior of Inter managers against FIGC members, had not found disciplinary breaches. The scanty press release states: “The federal prosecutor, examined the report of the investigations office on the verification requested by the federal Prosecutors Office (…) has ordered the dismissal of the proceedings, not having emerged prosecutable facts of disciplinary importance or within the statutory period (…)”. Despite the documentation sent by the tribunal of Milan, Palazzi closes the case. For him, Inter managers have not committed any offence. The sports case seems closed; the penal case follows a different route, with timing and methods significantly different from the sports justice. On May 28, 2010, the GUP Panasiti [the GUP is the Judge for Preliminary Hearing – ed], who deals with the preliminary hearing of the Telecom case, pronounces a sentence which deviates from the requirements of the Prosecutors: the defendants are not guilty of embezzlement; they did not act as loose cannons, but according to guidelines known to the management.
The grounds published on June 14 read: “That Ghioni acted on his own is clearly unlikely; that Tavaroli was managing practices of that kind in his own interest is also highly unlikely. The reconstruction of the events provided by the Prosecutors and by Telecom and Pirelli was clearly contradicted by the case documentation. The two companies have come to a substantial acceptance of the disputes by accessing the application of the fines.””Telecom and Pirelli were well aware of the invoices issued by foreign companies for a business that was formally devolved to the execution of well-identified, immutable and well-known characters such as Cipriani and Bernardini.” “Budgets were regularly approved following the hierarchic mechanisms up to the board of directors. Here there were President Marco Tronchetti Provera and CEO Carlo Buora. Budgets approved without any remark at all.”
It is clear that Palazzi’s hurry to dismiss the case cannot be reconciled at all with the recent decision of the Judge Panasiti. Analyzing the same documents, Dr. Panasiti did not consider Telecom management, Tronchetti Provera and Carlo Buora in the first place, as unrelated to the espionage activity. One of the two
(Panasiti or Palazzi) is obviously wrong. And, to avoid any misunderstandings, we trust the judges of the Court of the State, those established by the Constitution.” (28) Do you still have doubts?
Hi everyone, 

We are fans, just like you, of that football team that gave us 29 League Titles won on the pitch, nine Italian Cups, 2 European Cups and an endless series of emotions, men and plays remained in the history of football. And in our minds. A team that…either you hate, or you are madly in love with: Juventus. 

With this report of a few pages, we would like to trace the origin and the implementation of a farce with no equal in the history of our Country; for years, in fact, some newspapers and TV programmes with self-styled slow-motion replays analysts and commentators have raised the masses against the football power of a team of absolute value, pillorying on the media any conduct of our managers and players and creating this way that “people’s sentiment” that has contributed more than anything else to relegate us to Serie B. We do not want to mouth rhetoric, in fact, quite the contrary. All the statements, as already said, will be briefly analyzed, leaving no space to our comments, surely “biased”. We will go straight to the truth. We will not fling any accusations; we will not name the names or report the facts if not widely documented by laws, sentences, documents, statements (and not hearsays). 

Over recent years, Juventus and its managers have often been investigated, prosecuted…but are we sure we know the events as they really happened? Have we ever been convicted? And are we sure that other clubs that declared themselves “honest” had not committed out-and-out criminal offences over unsuspected years? We believe that only few of you are aware of how things are and only a careful analysis of all the news circulating on internet has led us to uncover the harsh reality. 

Our aim is to spread as much as possible the truth, too often hushed up by the media: the only act of presumption we could be accused of is the willingness to make EVERYONE understand, both Juventus brothers and others, that what was committed in 2006 and all that preceded and followed, is a scandal that should not only concern 2-3000 frantic fans, but an entire people. A Country that declares itself civil, like ours, cannot have concealed a mess so obvious and that includes a series of unheard-of outrages… 

We are confident that soon even those who are in the dark will understand. 

We conclude by thanking the editorial staff of the website (read “juventinovero”), online magazine, our precious and irreplaceable source of information and articles, and all “friends” websites we have drawn from to write these few pages, concise to the bone by necessity, but full of news, perhaps unknown to many of you (repeat: NEWS, OBJECTIVE FACTS, not “rumors”). Any link to the original article may be consulted free of charge on the web. Many websites that carry out our own same battles will be mentioned in the links and bibliography section. 
We do not certainly do it for money, we do not want to pass for a pain in the neck, and we have no copyright. We are doctors, nurses, surveyors, engineers, workers, housewives, clerks, lawyers, students, Juventus small shareholders, journalists…who do not act for profit: print and share as many copies as you can! 
Maybe we have a last wish: we would like that all the Juventus people could finally be close-knit. At stake there is the restitution of the league titles deservedly won on the pitch and, above all, the return of the dignity as well as the rehabilitation before the nation and the world. We would be pleased that, in the event of a favorable outcome, we could all come together to celebrate; and that, if necessary, we would be ready to give full support to the club management, in every possible, available, civil and lawful way. 

Only and forever “Forza Juve”.

Corrado de Biase: (Head of Investigations Office in 1980): “The trial held this summer has given birth to a “juridical abortion”” 
Francesco Cossiga: “I feel ashamed for that travesty of justice which is the Commission of Federal Appeal: I was very surprised that a serious jurist stooped so low as to go to chair it… ” 
Enzo Biagi: “An insane ruling because it was built on nothing, on wiretaps difficult to interpret and unserviceable in a trial worthy of the name (…). It might be that to cover a giant-sized scandal (Laziogate, Telecom, ed) they have identified Moggi as the villain to feed the populace?” 
Piero Ostellino (journalist, formerly director of “Corriere della Sera”): “All of them agreed to a moralistic formula, for a visceral hatred against Juve or just stupidity (…) because the Italian press too often (not just in this respect) is simply obscene.” 

For the dignity, for the history of Juventus, but also for the future of the team and the club For Italy: for the cancellation of an unprecedented farce, which hit the 4th industry in the country (football) 1) Revocation of the of the “cardboard” 2005/2006 Scudetto, awarded to Inter in 2006; 2) Complete revision of the sports sentences; 3) Return of the titles for lack of crimes (along with any penalties for other clubs found guilty); 4) Compensation under the civil law; 

– URGE THE OWNERS, WITH THE AVAILABLE MEANS (letters, e-mail, banners, …) SHOULD THEY NOT COMPLITELY COMMIT IN THE DISPUTE (but finally, after four years of devastating management, with the arrival of Andrea Agnelli, signs of a strong and determined club presence can be seen).